Optimizely Scripts Hijacked to Skim Cards on 178 Sites
An attacker used a flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation to inject skimmer code into customer scripts on sites including CNN, the BBC and Zoom. Here is what to check.

An attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation and planted malicious JavaScript in scripts that customer sites load from the service. Optimizely said so in an incident notice posted at 01:02 UTC on November 17. The vendor says it has fixed the flaw and removed the code.
What changed
According to The Hacker News, Report URI found the code in 188 snippets belonging to 178 organizations, out of 1,611 snippets it checked. Named victims include CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. The firm says the real count is likely higher because it only checked snippets it had found in time.
The code was built to swap crypto wallet addresses for the attacker’s and to capture card details. Report URI cannot say how many card numbers were exposed. On iPhones and iPads it also set up a second stage that the firm identifies as an iOS exploit kit, though it reports no devices actually taken over.
Timeline from the reporting
- First injection seen at 04:21 UTC on November 16, in the BBC’s snippet.
- Mass cleanup began around 20:40 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk’s snippet still carried the code.
- Smartsheet’s script was cleaned once, then re-infected with a hidden version, which suggests the attacker still had access at that point.
What the notice does not say
Optimizely’s notice does not explain how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, when the fix went in, whether the attacker still has access, or what customers should do. No CVE ID has been published for it in the sources we have. Treat anything beyond the vendor’s statement and Report URI’s analysis as unconfirmed.
What to do
Fuse’s call: this is a first-party-script problem, so the fix sits with your web team, not your patch cycle.
- Find out if you use it. Check every page template for an Optimizely snippet, including ones served from your own domain. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same project.
- Review Project JavaScript. The loader was written into the custom-code field of customer projects, and the rest of each snippet was left alone. Diff that field against what your team last approved.
- Search logs and CSP reports for connections to the indicators in Report URI’s technical analysis, and review your Optimizely account activity and user access.
- Rotate access on the Optimizely account and enforce MFA, since the vendor says it secured affected accounts but has not described the access path.
- Prioritize checkout and login pages. If a card-capture script ran there, talk to your payment processor and legal team.
A site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems compromised, according to Cynet’s researchers. The exposure is to visitors, not your servers.
Analysis
Third-party script tags keep paying off for attackers because one upstream write path reaches hundreds of unrelated sites, and the vendor’s own certificate makes the payload look legitimate. A content security policy that limits where scripts can send data is the control that helps when the script source itself is trusted.
Related coverage: BO Team used Log4Shell to breach a Russian developer, Storm-0940 hits ConnectWise Cloud Backup, and Uber’s third-party breach. More in the supply chain hub.
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